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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that the policies implicit in economic fundamentalism are not inevitable because of the logic of capitalism, but are 
policies that have been actively promoted by the corporate sector in its own interests. The ideology of economic fundamentalism presents 
a rigid conditioning framework which affects economic and other public policies which have been important for women's equality and 
consequently, has undermined feminist successes in Canada. 
RESUME 
Cet expose soutient que les politiques implicites dans le fondamentalisme economique ne sont pas inevitables a cause de la logique du 
capitalisme, mais qu'elles sont des politiques qui ont ete promues de facon active par les grandes compagnies, pour leurs propres interets. 
L'id£ologie d'un fondamentalisme dconomique prdsente un cadre de conditionnement rigide, qui affecte les politiques dconomiques et 
d'autres politiques publiques qui ont ixi importantes pour l'^ galite' des femmes et par cons6quent,ont amoindri les succes fdministes au 
Canada. 
WHAT'S 'NEO' ABOUT 
NEO-CONSERVATISM? 
I recently heard someone on the radio 
lamenting the sorry state of our society at the end of 
the twentieth century: he referred to Yehudi 
Menuhin's observation that the twentieth century 
began by raising hopes and was ending by destroying 
all illusions and ideals. This seemed to me to be a 
remarkably apt way of characterizing the shift in 
power structures over the past ten years and the 
resignation of the public to the prospect of a bleak 
future. 
The hopes at the beginning of the twentieth 
century were for an ability to create societies which 
eliminated situations of gross privilege for some 
while most people laboured hard and died early. The 
century began with notions of how to expand 
democracy to make it an idea which could include 
everyone, not just white, propertied males. The 
century began with experiments with different ways 
of living together and organizing society, 
experiments which recognized that different 
circumstances of people and nations, and even 
different aspirations and ideals would require unique 
ways to meet needs. Even technology, at the 
beginning of the century, was perceived by many as 
a leveler, a means of overcoming starvation and 
disease: these advantages of technology which had 
benefited people in capitalist industrialized nations, 
it was thought, could be expanded to benefit even the 
most disadvantaged on earth. 
The century began with a knowledge that all 
this could be achieved only if capital could be 
controlled and directed in the best interests of people. 
This was the great project of the twentieth century. 
The advent of the capitalist industrial age two 
centuries ago was raw and brutal, producing a vicious 
society in which the excesses of market logic were 
immediately apparent. As old forms of social 
organization, however imperfect, were destroyed 
with the growth and dominance of "the market," the 
loss of "society" to economic relations—or at least the 
ways in which people related to each other in work 
and other aspects of social relations—forced on 
people the recognition that they could not survive the 
pure logic of market capitalism.1 The taming of the 
market was not easy and required centuries of 
activism, experimentation, and defiance before 
institutions could be created which would stabilize 
this inherently unstable system. Throughout the 
industrialized world attempts were made in the 
nineteenth century to protect people through poor 
laws and factory legislation, although it was not until 
the twentieth century that the idea—that regulating the 
capitalist market and taxing capital could create a 
progressively humane society—became a reality. The 
Keynesian-related understanding of creating a system 
of social welfare as integral to the functioning of a 
mature capitalist system seemed more than an 
experiment: it identified an age in which the 
well-being of the economy depended on the 
well-being of the people in it and it seemed to 
provide the solution to the deep contradictions of 
capitalism. 
The other great experiments in response to 
the brutality of market capitalism were the socialist 
ones. The struggle to institute collective ownership 
and socialist notions of distribution were significant 
not only for the ideals within socialist countries 
themselves, but also for their demonstration effect (of 
the promise of socialism) to capitalist societies. The 
very existence of the practical implementation of 
socialism was a sufficient threat to the stability of 
capitalism to provide a significant political impetus 
for business and government together to respond to 
more egalitarian ideas of distribution within capitalist 
countries. The persistent need to provide for the 
unemployed, to smooth out the recurring booms and 
busts, and the need to cope with the sheer idea of 
economic equality forced governments to provide 
social programs people needed and to reshape 
political institutions which would experiment with 
new ways to include people in the decision-making 
process. 
The message at the end of the century is that 
the experimentation is over. There is only one 
approach which can be acceptable in the ordering of 
public life, that associated with "free markets," and 
any societies which deviate from this will be 
banished to the periphery of public life. The apparent 
inevitability, through the remarkable convergence of 
political and economic institutions around the world, 
of societies shaped rigidly by free trade and 
competition, has ushered in The Age of 
Disappointment. The promise now, by political and 
economic elites, is not for a future with greater 
equality and economic security, but one in which 
economic stability and social welfare are, rather, 
impediments to the objectives of globalization. 
While economic dislocation has been a consistent 
feature of all modern economic societies, in the past 
the disruptions of unemployment and increased 
poverty caused by economic crises were normally 
criticized and seen as aberrations in the system. Ideas 
about how to eliminate both poverty and 
unemployment dominated economic discussion. 
Now, with the restructuring associated with 
globalization, poverty and unemployment are not 
viewed as temporary phases which will disappear 
with the end of a specific economic crisis, but are 
considered to be normal features of international 
competition. This is the critical difference between 
economic change now and economic change in other 
eras. In the past the elites promised a better life for 
most people, in the long run. This progressive idea of 
economic change is no longer the justification for 
economic policy, which focuses almost solely now on 
the competitive benefits for business internationally. 
Social and economic well-being for people is 
subordinate to the well-being of the corporate sector: 
harmonization downward is perceived to be 
necessary so that no nation will be disadvantaged 
because its corporate sector cannot compete 
internationally. A consistent theme of the corporate 
sector, that the economy can no longer support 
expensive social programs, is directly linked to the 
downward spiralling of social welfare through the 
process of international harmonization. 
How did we get to a point where as a 
society, we've more or less given up on the notion of 
controlling greed? How did freedom become so 
narrowly constrained to mean only economic 
freedom? How did human society become so 
decidedly an accessory to the economic system? 
And, how did the logic of the welfare state get 
broken? 
The new economic orthodoxy is, in some 
ways, very familiar, but its "inevitability" and the 
fundamentalist zeal with which it is pursued gives it 
a disturbing new dimension. The world is certainly 
changing, but that is something which in itself is not 
new: economic restructuring has been the very 
defining feature of capitalism. Even the acceleration 
of change is so familiar that change is expected and 
anticipated. The ideas associated with the new 
economic orthodoxy too are familiar. These ideas 
have dominated the world of economists and public 
policy makers for a few hundred years. What then, is 
different? 
I will argue in this paper that the shift to the 
right at the end of the twentieth century was not 
inevitable because of the logic of economic forces, 
but was a carefully planned occurrence. Ideas about 
the moral superiority of personal responsibility and 
the freedom of individual choice have gained 
ascendancy through deliberate strategies of control 
and dissemination of ideas on behalf of the corporate 
elite. These ideas have, then, become the foundation 
for shaping international political institutions which 
have provided a rule book, or conditioning 
framework, affecting future decision-making. 
Throughout this process the nation state has shifted 
its role from one which mediated, in at least some 
way, between the competing interests of the rich and 
powerful and those of most people, to one which 
followed the path of least difficulty, by championing 
mainly the interests of the powerful. The changing 
nature of the state was itself made possible by the 
conditioning framework put in place by international 
political institutions. M y focus on the state will be 
important because it relates to my final point, which 
is that the neo-conservative direction is not an 
inevitable one and collective political action could 
force governments to respond to ideas substantially 
different from those of the neo-conservative elites. 
This is of critical importance to disadvantaged groups 
because it has been through the logic of the welfare 
state that major advances in redistribution have been 
advanced in our society. These ideas and economic 
institutions have been critical in shaping the 
egalitarian successes of feminism in Canada.2 
T H E BREAK IN THE LOGIC 
In its first issue for 1997, the Globe and 
Mail's publication, Report on Business, featured an 
article on the United States, "Big Brother Bows Out." 
The article's lead seemed to breathe a sigh of relief: 
"at long last, jolting reforms are in store for formerly 
untouchable institutions, including social security, 
public education and welfare."3 
Just a few years ago expressing this kind of 
sentiment would have been unthinkable. Newspaper 
editors, as well as politicians knew people 
appreciated and loved social programs. Welfare may 
always have been suspect, because it was the down 
and out who needed it, but public education, public 
health care, and public old age pensions were needed 
by everyone. They're still revered, at least in Canada, 
according to the most extensive and recent surveys on 
the issue.4 Despite the popularity of social programs, 
the media relentlessly pushes the need for change and 
politicians, even those in NDP governments, are 
echoing the sentiment, although usually these 
politicians are more circumspect and do not directly 
advocate privatization, but rather refer to the need for 
"public/private partnerships" and "deregulation." 
With prisons and even publicly funded welfare 
schemes being run by private enterprise in the U.S., 
the ideas about reducing, redesigning, privatizing or 
eliminating social programs, which were once 
shocking and untouchable in Canada, now seem not 
just reasonable, but necessary. It isn't even 
unthinkable, as the market invades all spheres, for 
sense to be made of the idea that companies should 
make profits out of poverty.5 When confronted with 
the continued insistence that we can no longer afford 
expensive social programs, people in Canada quite 
sensibly, then, feel it is time to explore other 
alternatives. 
The shift in the logic of capitalism which led 
people to begin to abandon their support of the public 
sector required both the idea that the public sector 
could no longer be adequately supported collectively 
through taxes, and the erection of an apparatus 
internationally which assured that this thinking would 
appear logical. These two developments are 
inseparable, but I will proceed to develop the 
argument by first discussing the ways in which the 
increased economic integration of nations, through 
trade liberalization, broke the logic of the cooperation 
of business, government, and people in the welfare 
state. 
The development of the social welfare state, 
particularly in the shape it took after World War II, 
required the cooperation of the corporate sector. For 
a long while—from the end of the depression of the 
1930s until the mid-1980s,~economic policies which 
focused on full employment, high wages, and social 
support systems made sense to the corporate 
community as a group.6 Individually each business 
knew that it could make higher profits than its 
competitors i f it could reduce costs by paying low 
wages to its workers and avoiding taxes. But 
collectively the corporate world understood that if 
selling products or services meant a reliance on 
people within the nation to buy them, it would be 
important for these people to have the money to do 
so. The welfare of the people within a nation was 
intrinsically linked to the ability of mass production 
to find a mass of customers to purchase the things 
produced. Individually corporations could do well i f 
unemployment rates were high because then workers 
would be competing for jobs and wages would fall, 
but this low-wage strategy could not work for all 
producers simultaneously if they wanted to sell all 
they produced. A similar logic prevailed for the 
provision of public works and social programs: 
individually firms would have higher profits if they 
did not pay taxes, but collectively they would suffer 
if the state could not afford an infrastructure to 
support business activities. 
With the uncoupling of the production of a 
nation from its markets, as is the intention with trade 
liberalization, the logic of maintaining a high 
standard of living within a nation begins to loose its 
saliency. The growth in the significance of export 
markets means that higher rates of unemployment 
and lower wages can be tolerated, since the people 
within the country will not be required to buy all that 
is produced within the country in order for the 
corporate sector to maintain itself. This dynamic has 
been spectacularly obvious in Canada since the 
introduction of free trade. Canada has been a more 
export-oriented country than most, with historically 
between twenty-five and thirty percent of its national 
income coming from selling things to other countries. 
This is in contrast to other countries like Japan, which 
derives about fifteen percent of its national income 
from trade, and the U.S., whose trade-related income 
is even less significant to its total, usually at about 
twelve percent a year.7 Since the introduction of 
N A F T A the significance of trade has increased 
substantially for Canada so that by 1995 thirty-eight 
percent of the national income came from trade. 
Under these circumstances the logic of a Keynesian 
welfare state became easier to undermine. The result 
is an export-led economy with unemployment and 
low wages as its permanent defining features. From 
the perspective of corporations, not having to rely on 
selling what they produced within the nation is ideal 
because costs can be lowered significantly without 
danger of creating economic conditions which would 
negatively affect their ability to sell, as would be the 
case in a more closed economic system. 
Internationally the corporations can become "more 
competitive," as we've seen occur within Canada. 
THE INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONING 
FRAMEWORK 
OR, 
HOW GLOBALIZATION MAKES PEOPLE 
POORER 
Globalization is normally thought of as the 
process of rapid escalation in the international 
organization of production and distribution through 
the universalization of capitalism.8 It is this, but it is 
something beyond this in that it entrenches values, 
through the structures which facilitate the mobility of 
capital and speculative finance, which provide a view 
of the world in which the interests of the powerful are 
defined as necessity, while the demands of the poor 
appear as greed which undermines economic success. 
The ideology which sees increasing 
integration of international economies as a positive 
step and one which would inevitably occur, if 
markets are not unduly hampered by governments, is 
based on the nineteenth century notion of 
comparative advantage. The argument is that trade 
between nations will always benefit all parties 
involved. Earlier trade theory understood that trade 
would occur when one country produced something 
that either another country could not, or could 
produce only at great cost, (the least-cost theory) and 
that the objective for every country was to encourage 
exports and restrain imports in order to bring more 
gold or silver into the country: any benefit to one 
nation was matched by costs to other nations, so that 
there were no net gains from trade. In contrast, the 
theory of comparative advantage understood trade to 
be to the advantage of both trading partners, even 
when one country produced everything more cheaply 
than the other. The explanation for this is that if each 
country used its resources to produce and trade things 
in which it had a "relative" advantage, all countries 
would be better off and total production in the world 
would increase. This was a revolutionary notion and, 
since it was basically a counter-intuitive notion, was 
not automatically taken up throughout the world. But 
during the nineteenth century when British 
imperialism was at its height, Britain's ideological 
dominance in trade and ideas about trade began to 
prevail. It was not until very recently in the twentieth 
century, however, that the apparatus to entrench the 
ideology of free trade internationally was put into 
place. The objective of free trade has been the 
governing principle of international economic 
organizations since the Bretton Woods conference in 
1944. The threat of the return of conditions of the 
1930s, which were believed to have been caused by 
excessive trade protectionist measures of nations, was 
the justification for the pursuit of the ideal. The plan 
was for the move toward free trade to proceed 
incrementally and with each "round" of the General 
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which 
occurred at ten year intervals, further measures 
liberalizing trade were introduced. The whole free 
trade initiative was accelerated with the Canada/U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA, 1989); the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1991); 
and the last General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
which replaced itself with the World Trade 
Organization which came into effect in 1995. 
Free trade is pursued because international 
corporations want to create conditions for the free 
movement of capital and freedom from the ability of 
nation states to inhibit business transactions. 
According to the U N Centre on Transnational 
Corporations, between 80 and 90% of the exports of 
industrialized countries are in the hands of giant 
international corporations with sales of over $1 
billion annually. There are 6000 of these throughout 
the world and they are responsible for twenty-five 
percent of everything produced in the world, yet they 
employ only three percent of the world's labour force. 
The main point to understand from this is that the 
international economy has been designed with these 
giant players in mind and the rules for action 
accommodate their best interests. The narrow 
interests this free trade regime favours is startling 
when one considers Canada's export situation. A 
recent World Trade Organization report pointed out 
that only fifty companies in Canada account for about 
half of the country's total exports. Many of these are 
the U.S.-owned automotive companies which 
dominate exports in Canada.9 
The ideology of free trade is a very powerful 
tool for international capital to shape the world 
according to its advantage. The belief that the pure 
workings of the market at the international level will 
ultimately sort out all human needs has almost 
evangelical proportions and is quite at odds with the 
more pessimistic message at the national level about 
the effect of increased competition. As one recent 
commentator put it, "...aggressive free trade is good. 
Busy sea-lanes and teeming ports are the 
handmaidens of prosperity for all . . ." 1 0 However, 
even for some supporters of free trade, it is now 
becoming clear that the real world is not as neat as 
traditional trade theory would like us to believe. The 
profound dislocations caused by international 
competition are recognized by the above 
commentator, who is calling for some kind of 
international regulation of financial markets. Trade 
can bring huge benefits, but also can have tragic 
consequences for the shape of a nation's future. This 
has been most obvious in nations in Africa and Latin 
America which have been encouraged (or forced) to 
specialize in export production to the detriment of 
feeding their own people. The shift to crops or 
manufactured items which command lucrative prices 
on international markets fits squarely into the notion 
of comparative advantage. According to trade theory, 
it is rational to shift resources from small-scale, 
largely self-sufficient individual household 
production to large-scale production of products for 
the export market. The higher incomes from trade can 
then be used to import cheaper food from western 
countries. It is all rational until foreign markets turn 
sour for the specific export (something which occurs 
with depressing regularity) and the price of importing 
food to feed the people who no longer have an 
income becomes ruinous. This is the common 
trajectory of poor nations who are hopelessly in debt 
to banks in wealthy countries, as they borrow during 
global economic downturns just to feed their 
populations. This has been good business for banks in 
countries like Canada and the U.S. According to a 
recent Oxfam report, Trade Liberalization: the Corn 
Sector in the Philippines, Africa has repaid what it 
borrowed one and a half times over. Last year alone 
poor nations paid the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) $1 billion more than it lent them in new 
loans." The logic of an integrated international 
production and distribution system benefits western 
corporate interests but results in desperate poverty for 
many parts of the world. 
ONE MARKET, MANY STATES 
Within industrialized nations the ability of 
the state to control the actions of corporations appears 
to have been seriously restricted by the new 
international context of globalization. The great 
advantage of the new international rules of trade to 
multinational corporations is their ability to escape 
regulation of nation states. The trade agreements 
work toward establishing one giant global market, 
while, at the same time, limiting the nature of the 
supranational institutions to market-creating 
activities. These are mainly actions designed to create 
greater capital mobility and to expand international 
markets in general. Unlike the work of nation states, 
which over time have developed institutions either to 
correct the economy when the market did not 
function in an optimal way, such as during times of 
depression, or to control business, such as through 
labour or environmental legislation, the international 
replacements are being created neither to exert 
discipline on the market nor to function as 
instruments of market-correction. These functions are 
still the responsibility of nations, but as multinational 
corporations become more mobile, the ability of 
corporations to escape the regulation of states 
increases. As nations compete with each other to have 
businesses locate in their own countries, the ability to 
control corporate activity comes into direct conflict 
with the increased mobility of these corporations. 
Unless all nations agree to behave in the same way 
with regard to corporate behaviour, the corporations 
will not be disciplined at all. Any one nation, by 
insisting on greater standards of corporate behaviour, 
will be disadvantaged and its corporations will claim 
that they are being made uncompetitive relative to 
other corporations in the international market. Since 
there is no mechanism for the nations to act 
collectively, individual state action is critically 
weakened. The new international trade agreements 
have facilitated the creation of a single market 
without a single state to regulate it. In this sense the 
growth in power of the corporate sector places 
nations in about the same stage of control over capital 
as they had at the dawn of the industrial revolution. 
Our national institutions are not equipped to cope 
with the nature of the changes which have taken 
place. The important point is, however, not that these 
changes in the control over capital were inevitable, 
but that the corporate sector worked hard over the 
years to see that they would occur. 
DEBT/DEFICIT 
Within nations, the conditioning framework 
of international trade plays itself out in a variety of 
ways. The most familiar device to control the 
economy relates to the changes in the welfare state as 
the result of the problems with government deficits 
and the accumulated debt: they seem to justify radical 
changes. 
The usual argument from the business elites 
and their political supporters is that expensive social 
programs can no longer be supported by the public 
sector. This is because they require high taxes to 
finance them and these high taxes are bad for several 
reasons, including increased costs for the 
corporations, making their products more expensive 
on international markets, and putting less money in 
the hands of consumers for buying things on the 
private market. The corporate sector favours reducing 
government spending on social programs so that 
taxes can be lowered. The added benefit for the 
private sector is that services which had been 
provided publicly then get shifted to the private 
sector and are provided for profit. Increasing 
privatization is directly linked to the debt and deficit 
hysteria in Canada. 
The federal government deficit (the 
difference between government revenues and what it 
spends) is large, but the impression that the problem 
arose because of uncontrolled government 
expenditures on social programs is a wild 
exaggeration, at best, or deliberate misinformation, if 
one is sceptical of whose interest this impression 
serves.12 The government has a deficit only because 
it pays a huge amount of money in interest payments 
on the debt (the sum of past deficits). In 1996 this is 
the largest single item on the government's books, 
accounting for about $47 billion, or about 35% of all 
the revenues it receives. Without these interest 
payments there is a substantial surplus in government 
accounts. In fact in all but two years since 1988 the 
government has taken in more money in taxes and 
other revenues than it has spent on all government 
programs and administration. In some years the 
operating surplus has been over $10 billion, but over 
the period between 1988 and 1995 the government 
has received a total of over $31 billion in revenues 
above what was necessary for expenses on social 
programs, other programs (like defence) and 
government administration.13 
Canada's debt began to become a problem in 
the mid-1980s for specific reasons related to the 
government's very conservative ideas about how the 
economy should be managed. The rise in government 
deficits in the 1980s was a response to a severe 
recession, one which affected Canada more than any 
other developed country. During this period 
unemployment rates soared to 12% and remained 
high, averaging over 10% for most of the time since 
then. Certain government programs which are 
designed to kick-in when the economy is not 
functioning well (that is, those cyclically-sensitive 
components of program spending like unemployment 
insurance and social assistance payments) caused 
government expenditures to rise more dramatically 
than revenues during this period. This is quite a 
normal occurrence during a depression period and 
this excess government spending would not have 
caused a problem, in fact it undoubtedly prevented 
the recession from being considerably worse than it 
was. 
Certainly a debt was being created, but it 
would not have escalated and become the problem it 
has become were it not for the excessively tight 
monetary policy pursued at this time and its reduction 
in taxes for corporations.14 The government's 
obsession with fighting inflation through high interest 
rates meant that each year the government paid more 
in interest payments for the money it had borrowed in 
the past. 
This high interest rate policy had long-term 
economic consequences. It depressed the recovery in 
private capital spending, since borrowing was much 
more costly. This meant that unemployment levels 
remained high and since income levels were 
depressed, so were government revenues. In addition 
to affecting government revenues, the amounts paid 
in interest on the debt increased yearly deficits. 
Another consequence which has had 
long-term political implications was the increased 
attractiveness of Canadian bonds to foreign investors 
because of their extraordinarily high yield. Less than 
3% of Canada's government debt was foreign-held in 
1970. And although this had increased to about 10% 
by 1980 as a result of the inflation-fighting policies 
of the late 1970s, this was still moderate compared to 
the proportion of the debt held outside the country 
now, which stands at about 25%. 1 5 The increased 
foreign debt holdings further accentuates the need to 
keep interest rates high as foreign bond holders' 
opinions of appropriate Canadian economic policy 
has increasing significance with policy makers. 
The restrictive monetary policy (that is, the 
focus on inflation as the most serious economic 
policy) was a severe over-reaction to a problem 
which did not really exist. The inflation rate in the 
early 1980s was high, but it fell from 11% in the 
early 1980s to about 4.5% when the Conservative 
government took power in 1984. That is, by this time 
inflation wasn't a problem but inflation fighting 
through high interest rates remained a crucial part of 
economic policy. Even today during an deflationary 
period the threat of inflation guides the Bank of 
Canada's interest rate policy. Real inflation does not 
and has not existed for over ten years. 
Canada has now had ten years of remarkably 
stable price levels. The strategy so ardently followed 
by the Bank of Canada and successive governments, 
despite party changes, simply has not worked.1 6 
Monetary policy designed solely around price 
stability did not automatically bring about confidence 
in economic performance. If anything, the results 
have been the opposite of those promised by the zero 
inflation strategy and some markets, most notably the 
labour and housing markets, are in a chronic state of 
instability.17 In the name of stability the Bank of 
Canada has created a very volatile economy: any 
increase in economic activity (particularly decreases 
in unemployment rates) brings quick reaction from 
the central bank to trigger the mechanisms (higher 
interest rates) which generate further instability. 
The main point to be made about the deficit 
is that it has not arisen from reckless government 
spending. The deficit exists because of an 
ideologically driven, recklessly restrictive monetary 
policy which has created conditions resulting in both 
higher costs for government and reduced revenues. 
The cure of reducing spending on counter-cyclical 
programs cannot solve either the deficit problem or 
the economic morass experienced by most of the 
country. Controlling the deficit without solving the 
underlying weaknesses in the economy will only 
mean years and years of economic hardship for some, 
and high rates of unemployment, and a decline in the 
standard of living of most Canadians. 
This is where the policy procedures bog 
down. Economic orthodoxy suggests that just letting 
the market take its course will ultimately right a 
dismal situation. Perhaps some external event could 
occur to stimulate economic activity, but waiting for 
this to happen is not a wise strategy. An active 
economic strategy to ensure full employment and to 
meet other social and economic goals, as so often has 
been said, is needed. 
The distinction now, between this and any 
other time in Canadian history, is that the ability for 
a government to act takes a great deal more political 
courage than it ever did. This is because the 
economic tools to discipline the market are not as 
readily available as they were in the past and the 
decision to reassert the right to use these tools 
requires a bold political step. But because the tax 
burden has shifted more onto people than on to 
corporations at the same time that people are 
experiencing a reduction in the kinds of services they 
are used to receiving from government, there is a 
general lack of support, or even distrust of 
government in general. Under these circumstances, 
the policies which are so against the interests of the 
general public and in the interests of the corporate 
sector, seem to gain more and more support. 
THE POWER OF FUNDAMENTALISM 
OR, 
WHY DO PEOPLE SEEM SO RESIGNED? 
The most obvious answer is because they are 
afraid. What is happening to our society is unfamiliar 
and the reasons for change are complex and difficult 
to explain. People are conscious of living on the edge 
of the unknown, a state which not only produces 
anxiety, but also social paranoia. Because the reasons 
for the rapid and unsettling change are so complex, 
representing innumerable social factors interacting in 
a way which appear, for the most part, inexplicable, 
people look for clear answers. This is the attraction of 
fundamentalism: the relationship between cause and 
effect is understood as something simple and clear. 
The message of the inevitability of 
neo-conservative change is the strongest political 
argument of economic fundamentalism. This idea, 
that there is some kind of organic-type growth which 
is inevitable, is not just an idea which is confined to 
the political maneuverings of the right—or even to its 
ideology, rather, it is something which is 
recognizable in the ideologies of both the left and the 
right. The classical liberal economic model was 
founded on the notion that there was a natural order 
to social organization, something akin to the natural 
order of the physical world. Science could uncover 
the rules which bound people together. The logic of 
this led to a sense that social relationships could be 
self-regulating through the market. Not too 
dis-similarly, the anti-utopian socialism of Marxists 
led to the belief that one could discover the logic of 
history and while people could make a difference, 
ultimately, it was only at the right moment—at the 
moment when it would, in a sense, be inevitable. 
The pervasiveness of our notion of the 
inevitable march of history is one of the reasons why 
the idea embodied in the phrase Margaret Thatcher so 
skilfully used, "there is no alternative," is so seldom 
challenged. The other reasons have a lot to do with 
the sheer power of those in control and the real 
difficulties of confronting that power. But power 
alone, without the supporting apparatus of the idea of 
what is inevitable, has been, historically, more easily 
challenged. Changing the thinking of people so that 
they believe in the inevitability of what the elites 
want is the real triumph. 
This change in the underlying ideology, or 
subconscious of a nation, requires planning, careful 
strategies, and the exercise of power: it does not 
happen spontaneously. This has been carefully 
orchestrated in Canada to such an extent that ideas 
that not only were unpopular but also were bad for 
the country, like free trade and restrictive monetary 
policies, are now realities which seemed inevitable. 
The best example of how a specific interest group 
focused its attention on changing the ideological 
approach of public policy is the actions of the 
ultra-right, Vancouver-based, Fraser Institute.18 
Over the past ten years or so the Fraser 
Institute's image shifted from being a comic example 
of ultra-right hyperbole to being the representation of 
reason, responsibility and authority on economic and 
social issues. No longer is its almost daily reference 
in the mainstream media prefaced with "right-wing 
think-tank." Rather, its ideas are now the norm and a 
recent editorial in The Globe and Mail even went so 
far as to assert that the most interesting new ideas 
were no longer coming from universities, but out of 
private research institutions like the Fraser Institute. 
Respectability has not come quickly to the 
Fraser Institute, but instant acceptance was not the 
Fraser Institute's measure of success or even its 
objective when it was established in 1974. Its 
founders knew "that it takes time to change 
intellectual consensus, that it takes time to move the 
focus of ideas and public attention from where it is to 
where it ought to be." IQ Where "it ought to be" is to 
understand that "competitive markets are the best 
mechanism for responding to change and providing 
for economic and social well-being of all Canadians." 
In putting forward this idea the Fraser 
Institute has been relentless and fearless, particularly 
in the early periods when what it was saying was not 
popular. Its particular interest initially was to find the 
hook~the economic justification~for their economic 
fundamentalist message. These "hooks" varied from 
the problem of "reverse discrimination," to 
government debt and the issue of excess taxes. Their 
"tax freedom" day, the day in the year when 
Canadians are said to begin finally working for 
themselves, has had an enormous impact on public 
opinion, but even more importantly, on public policy. 
Now that governments everywhere see the debt as 
their main problem and are all devoted to lowering 
taxes, the targets for the Fraser Institute have shifted 
to issues like eliminating the minimum wage and 
equity laws, and privatizing public entities like public 
education, public health care, public pensions, and 
public utilities. 
The Fraser Institute attributes a good portion 
of its success in changing public policy to reaching 
the policy makers in their formative years—when they 
are in Universities. The focus on students in 
universities now constitutes a major portion of the 
Fraser Institute's activities because it understands that 
"it is through these students that we build our future." 
According to its literature, the focus on students 
began when they read the resumes of cabinet 
ministers in the federal and provincial governments 
and realized that most of them had been involved as 
students in campus political organizations. They 
understand that once young people get caught up by 
the doctrine of the right they will retain it and spread 
these ideas as they mature and take influential 
positions in society. 
The core activity for students is a series of 
one-day seminars on public policy which are held in 
major cities throughout Canada on topics like the 
left-wing biases in newspapers and Canada's debt 
wall. They also provide university professors with 
up-to-date literature on public policy issues, 
information to distribute to classes about essay 
contests on right-wing subjects, and ways to involve 
students in research projects at the Institute. 
The contrast between the presence of the 
right and the left on university campuses is a mirror 
opposite from what it was in, say, the '60s and 70s. 
Feminists and trade unionists seem to have 
abandoned the universities to the business sectors. 
While I'm on lots of feminist and trade union mailing 
lists for material because of my personal connections 
with them, none of the material sent me is 
specifically targeted at students. When students try to 
use the trade unions, feminist organizations or 
poverty groups for information the responses are not 
always positive. Everyone is too pressed and too 
busy to take the time. 
There is no research and educational 
institute on the progressive side which has anything 
like the capacity of the Fraser Institute to reach 
students. For the right, students are a priority, for the 
left, reaching them is low down on the list of things 
to do. 
Ideas are dangerous. John Maynard Keynes' 
oft-quoted message at the end of The General Theory 
points to the problem: "...the ideas of economists and 
political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is 
commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by 
little else." The Fraser Institute is particularly adept at 
picking up ideas which are current in the U.S. (like 
the attacks on equity programs, and anti-deficit 
legislation), packaging them with Canadian content, 
and marketing them very effectively to the media and 
governments. The Fraser Institute's got it right when 
it says, " i f you are going to change the ideas of a 
society then you have got to be in the ideas business." 
WHY FOCUSING ON THE ECONOMY IS 
IMPORTANT FOR WOMEN 
The dramatic changes associated with economic 
restructuring and the consequent attacks on the 
welfare state have necessitated reactive political 
mobilization.2 0 Generally this reaction among 
feminist groups has focused on understanding the 
impacts of the policy changes on women and how 
change will affect either the way women relate to the 
state as providers or recipients of social welfare or 
how well the state protects individual group rights. 
As can be seen from this article, I am 
convinced that social welfare relies as significantly 
on economic policy which affects the way the market 
works, including government monetary and fiscal 
policy, budgets, taxation, trading relationships, and 
development policy, as it does on those state 
programs more normally associated with feminist 
actions directed toward redistributive policies. This 
does not mean that the struggle over women's rights 
and specific programs has been irrelevant or 
misguided or even that the effort to preserve what 
exists should be abandoned.21 But it does mean that 
public policy affecting all disadvantaged groups goes 
far beyond the implications of specific social 
programs, labour market policies, and the legal status 
of these groups. Less clear is how to develop a 
strategy for dealing with the inter-relatedness of 
social programs and regressive economic policies and 
to more specifically focus action on the institutions 
and ideologies which are shaping the ways the 
economy operates. 
There are alternatives to submission and the 
reduction of state functions to minimalist activities. 
Nations and people are not paralysed from acting in 
response to the increased power of the corporate 
sector. But it is important that this action be focused 
and deliberate and that it have a vision for the future. 
It is true that nations have lost the power of some of 
the traditional instruments through which they 
ensured corporate compliance with public policy, but 
it is equally true that governments have more power 
than they are prepared to exert. In showing how the 
ideology of the right has reshaped international and 
domestic institutions in ways which condition our 
behaviour, we run the risk of contributing to its 
assertion that the changes which are occurring are 
inevitable and "there is no alternative". Many of us 
who have argued against the institutions which 
entrenched globalization argued that there is an 
incompatibility between social welfare, democracy, 
and trade liberalization in order to gain political 
support for public opposition to the globalization 
process.22 But it is important not to over-emphasize 
the lack of ability to act. There is a fine balance 
between message of despair and those which inspire 
action. An analysis which shows the dangers in the 
new conditions will lead to despair if the alternatives 
to it are not sufficiently compelling and i f there is 
nothing concrete which can be suggested for action in 
the normal course of daily lives. Changing the world, 
or at least the trajectory which is now apparent, is an 
important goal, but most people will be unable to 
respond to this long-term initiative i f there is not 
some relationship between it and their immediate 
political concerns. I see feminists as well positioned 
to provide leadership on both the perspective for 
change at the international level and for political 
action in concrete immediate terms. 
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